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Results from a narrow set of empirical studies suggest that blind individuals’
comprehension of metaphorical expressions does not differ from that of sighted
participants. However, prominent accounts of metaphor comprehension yield different
predictions about the blind’s ability to comprehend visual metaphors. While conceptual
metaphor theory leads to predicting that blind individuals should lag behind their sighted
peers in making sense of this particular kind of utterances, from traditional accounts
of analogical reasoning it follows that blind individuals’ ability to comprehend the literal
meaning of visual concepts might be sufficient to support their metaphorical application.
In Experiment 1, 20 sighted and 20 congenitally blind participants were asked to select
the most appropriate meaning for visual, grasping and filler metaphorical expressions.
Results failed to reveal group differences for any type of metaphorical expressions. In
order to implement a more stringent test of blind individuals’ ability to understand visual
metaphors, in Experiment 2 blind and sighted participants were presented with very
novel figurative expressions, as indicated by low or no occurrence in the “Google”
corpus. In line with the results of Experiment 1, blind participants’ comprehension of
visual metaphors was both high in absolute terms and comparable to that of sighted
participants. We advance some speculations about the mechanisms by which blind
individuals comprehend visual metaphors and we discuss the implications of these
results for current theories of metaphor.
Keywords: figurative language, metaphor, conceptual metaphor, embodiment, blind
INTRODUCTION
Initial studies looking at di erences between blind and sighted populations in their comprehension
of figurative language were primarily concerned with carefully assessing anecdotal reports of
educators, according to which sensory deprivation might be associated with a delay in the
acquisition of pragmatic abilities and of a theory of mind. In one study, Pring et al. (1998) had
blind and sighted children aged 9–11 read 24 “strange stories” originally used by Happe (1994) as
a more advanced and naturalistic test of theory of mind than the standard theory-of-mind tasks.
As an example, the “sarcasm” situation tells that Tom had convinced Sarah to go on a picnic based
on the prediction that it would be a lovely sunny day, but that counter to Tom’s prediction, it
starts raining heavily right after beginning to unpack the food, to what Sarah exclaims: “Oh yes,
a lovely day for a picnic alright!” When queried about the reasons for specific actions of the
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characters (e.g., Sarah’s remark), blind participants provided
just as many mental justifications as the sighted participants.
However, their justifications were significantly less accurate. In
a more recent study, Pijnacker et al. (2012) exposed blind and
sighted children aged 5–13 to a subset of Happe’s “strange
situations” involving non-literal language, and which consisted
of lies, white lies, jokes, figure of speech, and irony or sarcasm.
In contrast to the previous study, no group di erences were
obtained. In the particular case of metaphor comprehension,
authors like Pérez-Pereira and Conti-Ramsden (1999) suggest
that eventual di erences between populations tend to be
overcome in late adolescence (see Sak-Wernicka, 2017, for a
review). Even though the available studies failed to obtain a
general advantage of sighted participants for making sense of
non-literal language, from conceptual metaphor theory (Lako 
and Johnson, 1980, Lako  and Johnson, 1999; Lako , 2008, 2014)
it follows that the congenitally blind might show some di culties
for comprehending a particular type of figurative expressions,
namely, those in which abstract concepts are metaphorically
understood in terms of more concrete concepts referred to the
visual domain.
According to conceptual metaphor theory, linguistic
expressions such as We are approaching Friday, We’ll soon reach
the end of the winter, or He left the old days behind demonstrate
the existence of a conceptual metaphor in English speakers’
minds, that is, an analogy between the base domain of space
and the target domain of time. With regards to psychological
mechanisms, conceptual metaphor theory posits that conceptual
metaphors are instrumental in both producing and interpreting
metaphorical expressions (Lako , 1993). For example, making
sense of a sentence such as We are approaching Friday supposes
the use of the “ego moving” version of the TIME IS SPACE
conceptual metaphor, by which the passage of time is depicted
in terms of one’s own displacement along a straight line in which
successive points represent moments in the future. This way, the
amount of time that will need to elapse for a future moment to
occur is represented as the distance the person has to advance in
order to reach its corresponding point in the line.
The typical experimental procedure for assessing the use of
conceptual metaphors during the interpretation of metaphorical
expressions consists in determining whether reading expressions
derived from a given conceptual metaphor facilitates the
comprehension of subsequent expressions pertaining to the same
conceptual metaphor, as compared to a control condition in
which those target expressions were preceded by expressions
pertaining to a mismatching conceptual metaphor. A wealth
of empirical studies employing this procedure (e.g., Gentner
and Boronat, 1991; Allbritton et al., 1995; Gibbs et al., 1997;
McGlone and Harding, 1998; Boroditsky, 2000; Gentner et al.,
2002; Langston, 2002; Thibodeau and Durgin, 2008) demonstrate
that people employ conceptual metaphors to understand
metaphorical expressions.
Classic cognitive science has tended to consider concepts
as amodal and arbitrary symbols, whereas embodied
perspectives on cognition have proposed that concepts consist
of modal analogical representations (e.g., Barsalou, 2008)
and, ultimately, on neural patterns of sensorimotor activity
(e.g., Gallese and Lako , 2005; Lako , 2008). A number of
neuroimaging and behavioral studies showed the involvement of
sensorimotor areas in conceptual processing. For example, the
recognition of words highly associated with auditory features
(e.g., “telephone”) elicits activation in areas of the auditory
association cortex that are associated to sound perception
(Kiefer et al., 2008). Reading action-related words and sentences
increases activation in cortical regions responsible for performing
the relevant movements (Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al.,
2005). Behavioral studies have provided further evidence for
the idea that concepts are grounded in perception and action.
To give an example, Pecher et al.’s (2003) participants verified
verbally expressed facts involving one modality (Leaves rustle)
more rapidly after verifying a fact involving the same modality
(Blenders make noise) than after verifying a fact involving a
di erent modality (Cranberries are tart).
Research on conceptual metaphors has revealed that whereas
the base domains refer to the application of perceptual and
motor processes to physical entities (e.g., walking forward), target
domains typically refer to abstract processes and entities (e.g., the
passage of time; Lako  and Johnson, 1980, Lako  and Johnson,
1999). The embodied approach has considered conceptual
metaphors as a particular medium by which the cognitive system
can provide a perceptual basis to abstract concepts (Kövecses,
2015), which have posed a serious challenge to the embodied
view (Dove, 2016). In line with this view, it has been postulated
that our understanding of metaphorical expressions derived from
conceptual metaphors is embodied, in the sense of involving
the simulation of the sensory-motor experiences that lie at their
foundation (Lako  and Johnson, 1980, Lako  and Johnson,
1999; Gallese and Lako , 2005; Gibbs, 2005; Feldman, 2006;
Lako , 2008, 2014; Johnson, 2010; Kövecses, 2016). Authors
like Gibbs (2005) or Johnson (2005) have emphasized that the
projection of the sensory-motor content onto a target concept
entails reproducing the qualitative subjective experience that
characterizes the base domain, and not merely the transfer of
an abstract and amodal schema devoid of phenomenological
substrate. According to Gibbs (2006a), these sensory-motor
simulations of the base domain are key to reaching an emphatic
representation of the qualitative experience that the author of
a metaphorical utterance has intended to communicate. Hence,
interpreting a sentence like He left the old days behind requires
simulating the experience of walking forward on a linear path
while leaving physical objects behind.
Conceptual metaphor theory distinguishes between two
kinds of conceptual metaphor: primary and complex (Grady
et al., 1996; Lako  and Johnson, 1999). Primary conceptual
metaphors derive directly from our common bodily experience,
whereas complex metaphors are combinations of primary
metaphors and cultural beliefs. Primary conceptual metaphors
like AFFECTION IS WARMTH—as conveyed in expressions
such as They gave me a warm welcome—are believed to arise
from correlations in everyday experiences where judgments
about a ective behavior are recurrently associated with sensory-
motor experiences of physical warmth (e.g., as a consequence
of being cuddled by a loving caregiver). From the neural
perspective of conceptual metaphor theory (Lako , 2008),
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this co-activation causes the strengthening of connections
between the neural circuits supporting di erent experiences,
connections that become reactivated during the interpretation of
metaphorical expressions.
In contrast to the wealth of evidence demonstrating the
activation of conceptual metaphors during the interpretation of
metaphorical expressions, only a handful of studies aimed at
demonstrating the role of sensory-motor simulations in making
sense of such expressions. For example, Wilson and Gibbs (2007)
demonstrated that performing an action corresponding to a
base concept (e.g., grasping) facilitates the comprehension of
sentences in which such concept is employed metaphorically
(e.g., John grasps the idea). Similar results (e.g., Boroditsky
and Ramscar, 2002; Ackerman et al., 2010; Santana and de
Vega, 2011; Gibbs, 2013) can be taken to suggest that sensory-
motor simulations subserve the comprehension of metaphorical
expressions derived from conceptual metaphors. This conclusion
is compatible with recent brain imaging studies. Boulenger
et al. (2009) found that both literal and figurative action
sentences involving verbs related to the leg and arm elicited
somatotopic activation. Lacey et al. (2012) used functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to demonstrate that texture-
selective somatosensory cortex in the parietal operculum is more
activated when processing expressions containing texture-based
metaphors (She has a rough day), as compared to literal sentences
matched for meaning. In this vein, it follows that individuals
who had not been exposed to the sensory-motor domain in
which conceptual metaphors are grounded should face serious
limitations for comprehending metaphorical expressions, to the
extent that their interpretation requires real-time simulations of
such sensory-motor domains.
According to Lako  and Johnson (1980) and Gibbs (2006b),
expressions such as There are some obscure points in the theory
and This is an illuminating paper on the subject constitute
evidence of a primary conceptual metaphor, by which the activity
of comprehending is understood in terms of visual concepts.
This way, in an expression such as A closer look at the idea will
better reveal its details the concept of comprehending an idea
in more detail could only be understood in terms of recreating
the sensory-motor experience of getting closer to an object,
with the consequent enhancement in its visual definition. From
this it follows that the congenitally blind should experience
serious di culties in making sense of metaphorical expressions
derived from the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING conceptual
metaphor.
In contrast to this account, theoretical proposals not
committed to the modal grounding of conceptual metaphors
lead to a more optimistic perspective for the possibility
that congenitally blind participants might comprehend visual
metaphors. In line with traditional positions in cognitive science,
several theories of analogy (e.g., Gentner’s structure-mapping
theory; see Bowdle and Gentner, 2005) assume that both the
source and the target domains of conceptual metaphors are
mentally represented in the form of propositions (the basic units
of the “language of thought”; Fodor, 1975), composed of amodal
symbols. Hence, they conceive metaphor as the projection of
amodal base concepts (referred to sensory-motor experiences but
not isomorphic to them) onto amodal representations of abstract
concepts.
As an illustration of how analogy theories apply to metaphor,
consider Virginia Woolf ’s metaphor She allowed life to waste
like a tap left running (derived from the LIFE IS A VALUABLE
RESOURCE and TIME IS A SUBSTANCE THAT FLOWS
conceptual metaphors) as discussed by Gentner et al. (1988).
Faced with this metaphorical expression, the interpreter is
assumed to start o  with some notion of water flowing through a
tap into a drain [FLOW (water, tap, drain)] with the consequent
disappearance of the water through the drain [DISAPPEAR
(water, drain)], as well as with the idea that waste occurs if
an agent allows such a flow to occur with no purpose, as
in CAUSE [WITHOUT-PURPOSE (FLOW (agent, tap, water),
WASTE (agent, water)]. It is also assumed that the interpreter
has the notion that life flows from present to past [FLOW (life,
present, past)] with the consequent disappearance of life into
the past [DISAPPEAR (life, past)], as well as the additional
proposition that the protagonist’s life is being wasted: WASTE
(protagonist, life). As implemented in Structure Mapping Engine
(SME, Falkenhainer et al., 1989), the cognitive system begins by
finding local matches—potential matches between single items in
the base and the target. For each entity and predicate in the base,
it finds the set of entities or predicates in the target that could
plausibly match that item. These potential match hypotheses are
determined by pairing identical relations (e.g., FLOW$FLOW),
checking whether the arguments of the paired relations are
formally identical (e.g., agents, patients, instruments, etc.),
and pairing such propositional elements according to their
roles within the proposition (e.g., water$life, tap$present,
drain$past). Due to the fact that the complete collection of local
matches may be inconsistent, the cognitive system disambiguates
inconsistencies by granting higher evidence scores when the
paired relations are each subordinate to higher order relations
which are paired as well (systematicity principle), as is reflected
here by the fact that the flow of water causes it to disappear
through the drain, just as the flow of life causes it to disappear
into the past. In a typical analogical comparison, unpaired base
assertions connected to global mappings are brought over to the
target domain as candidate inferences (e.g., the system brings
across the inference that the protagonist is letting her life pass
with no purpose, and that this purposeless flow is causing her life
to be wasted).
Given that analogical mapping and inference critically
dependent on variable binding, it has been postulated that
models that lack this key computational property (i.e., non-
propositional models) may not be able to capture analogical
thinking (Doumas and Hummel, 2005). The assumption
that propositional representations constitute the only medium
capable of supporting the comprehension, production and
extension of analogical comparisons, together with the idea that
conceptual metaphors consist of large-scale analogical mappings,
lead directly to the conclusion that they are necessarily encoded
in propositional format.
According to this perspective, interpreting a visual metaphor
such as His ideas were so luminous that they dazzled our
reason involves applying non-analogical symbols referred to
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the annulation of sight in order to understand other abstract
concepts referred to the possibility of assessing someone else’s
ideas in a proper way. An implication that follows from
this non-experiential account of conceptual metaphors is that
individuals could conceivably make sense of utterances derived
from a conceptual metaphor even if they had not acquired
direct sensory-motor experience with the base concepts to
which the target domain is metaphorically associated. In the
particular case of congenital blindness, the extent to which blind
participants will be capable of understanding visual metaphors
would depend critically on the richness and precision of their
(amodal) representations of visual concepts, as well as on their
ability to comprehend metaphors in general.
The hypothesis that blind individuals might succeed in
understanding visual metaphors is not only compatible with
classical amodal positions in cognitive science, but also with
more recent hybrid proposals, in terms of which modal
analogical representations coexist with amodal symbols hosted
in brain locations that are close to perceptual areas. The first
source of evidence for this idea involves neuropsychological
patients with disorders such as semantic dementia, a pathology
characterized by a bilateral atrophy of the temporal lobes, with
progressive loss of semantic memory for common objects. The
concomitant degradation of semantic knowledge often proceeds
in a hierarchical fashion. For example, patients gradually lose the
ability to identify more and more bird species, but remain able
to classify most of them as birds or animals (Hodges et al., 1995;
Patterson et al., 2007). With regards to neurotypical participants,
recent research shows that transcranial magnetic stimulation
of temporal areas leads to decreased e ciency with respect
to semantic-processing tasks (Pobric et al., 2010). Although
this decreased performance is far less catastrophic than the
impairments found among patients with semantic dementia,
it also implicates the anterior temporal lobes in semantic
processing. These findings are often seen as either a vindication
of classic amodal positions or as demonstration of the need for
a hybrid approach. A particular class of intermediate theories
expand on the notion of convergence zones (Damasio and
Damasio, 1994), positing amodal hubs that radiate to modality-
specific spokes in sensory-motor areas (Patterson et al., 2007;
Lambon Ralph et al., 2009). An influential example of these hub-
and-spoke theories locates a core, amodal hub for conceptual
processing bilaterally in the anterior temporal lobes (Lambon
Ralph et al., 2009; Pobric et al., 2010). Related theories have
postulated the existence of several hubs and o er a more dynamic
view of the interaction between amodal and modality-specific
systems (e.g., Binder and Desai, 2011; Watson and Chatterjee,
2011; Reilly et al., 2014).
Consistent with evidence for the existence of amodal areas,
some studies have failed to document di erences between
blind and sighted populations with respect to their literal
understanding of visual language (e.g., I see or Let me show
you), as well as of action verbs that convey visual motion (e.g.,
run) (e.g., Demott, 1972; Marmor, 1978; von Tetzchner and
Martinsen, 1980; Landau and Gleitman, 1985; Rosel et al., 2005;
Bedny et al., 2012; Dimitrova-Radojichikj, 2015). However, a
handful of studies have detected di erences in several aspects
related to color terms (e.g., Shepard and Cooper, 1992; Geld
and Stanojevic´, 2006; Geld and Starcˇevic´, 2006) and many other
visual concepts such as transparency or perspective (Blagden and
Everett, 1992; Marek, 1999). In light of these mixed results, the
question arises as to whether the knowledge that blind people
possess about the literal meaning of visual words is su cient to
support the metaphorical use of those terms.
In favor of the idea that blind’s knowledge of literal visual
terms might enable their metaphorical projection, most accounts
of metaphor processing posit that the metaphoric use of a base
concept typically involves highlighting some abstract relational
pattern over concrete particularities, in order to increase its
scope (Jamrozik et al., 2016; Gentner and Asmuth, 2017). For
instance, while the ability to understand or employ the literal
concept of moved photograph in an accurate way would demand
having observed such kind of images (e.g., so as to di erentiate
it from the murkiness caused by a dirty lens), comprehending
a metaphorical expression such as The report presents a moved
photo of the real situationmight only require extracting a coarser
meaning of the base concept (e.g., as involving “an imprecise
representation”), something that could potentially be a orded
by an amodal representation of the concept. In sum, it is at
least conceivable that the superiority that sighted participants
can exhibit with regards to the comprehension of literal visual
concepts may on occasions involve a level of detail that exceeds
what is required to understand their metaphorical applications.
In support of the hypothesis that modal information may
not be required for the metaphorical application of perceptual
concepts, several studies have shown that metaphorical use of
perceptual concepts elicits activation of motor areas to a lesser
degree than its literal use. For example, Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006)
analyzed the e ector-specific brain activation elicited by action
words embedded in either literal (e.g., Biting a banana) or
metaphorical sentences (e.g.,Handling the truth). Whereas literal
sentences gave rise to di erential activations in the premotor
cortex as a function of whether action verbs involved the hand,
the foot or the mouth, no such e ector-specific activations
were found among the corresponding metaphorical expressions.
In a related study, Desai et al. (2013) compared the neural
responses to sentences in which the same verb was used to
express either literal action (The daughter grasped the flowers),
metaphoric action (The public grasped the idea), idiomatic action
(The congress is grasping at straws in the crisis) or abstract action
(The public understood the idea). The authors observed that
the activation of the anterior inferior parietal lobule—an area
known to be associated with processing internal representations
of movements and body part positions, integrating object
knowledge and body representations—was higher for literal than
formetaphorical expressions and abstract expressions, suggesting
a role for high-level action simulations. While metaphorical
expressions also activated the aIPL, they did not involve primary
motor or motion-related areas, a result that was interpreted by
the authors as fitting with the proposal that our understanding of
metaphors depends in part on amodal systems.
Experiment 1 was carried out to assess whether congenitally
blind participants achieve a less appropriate comprehension of
visual metaphors, as predicted by conceptual metaphor theory, or
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whether their knowledge of literal visual concepts enables them
to understand visual metaphorical expressions on par with their
sighted peers.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Twenty congenitally blind (12 female, mean age = 26.15 years,
SD = 4.65) and 20 sighted participants (10 female, mean
age = 18.7 years, SD = 0.73) took part in the experiment for
a stipend. All of them were native speakers of Spanish, and
were first and second year undergraduates at major Argentine
universities. The causes of blindness included retinopathy
of prematurity (8), congenital glaucoma (4), optic nerve
abnormalities (5) and Leber’s amaurosis (three). All participants
signed an informed consent for participation in the study in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
All participants listened to a set of 30 short (<5 words)
metaphorical expressions comprising 10 expressions in which
phenomena related to the domain of understanding were
expressed in visual terms (e.g., Clear book; henceforth visual
metaphorical expressions), 10 expressions in which the domain
of understanding was conveyed in terms of grasping (e.g.,
Handle an idea; henceforth grasping metaphorical expressions)
and 10 metaphorical expressions not based on culturally shared
conceptual metaphors (e.g., turtle employee; henceforth other
metaphorical expressions). Appendix A lists the original visual
expressions in Spanish, together with their English translation.
While the latter type of metaphorical expressions served as
a control for whether blind and sighed participants were
similarly able to comprehend metaphorical language in general,
grasping metaphorical expressions served to assess whether both
populations were equally capable of understanding metaphorical
expressions derived from another primary conceptual metaphor
applicable to the concept of comprehending. Each metaphor was
followed by a multiple choice question including four options:
its most appropriate meaning, two defensible but less precise
interpretations of its meaning, and an alternative for when
the participant could not make sense of the expression. As an
example, the target expression Clear book was followed by (a)
book that is easy to comprehend, (b) clever book, (c) attractive
book, and (d) the expression doesn’t make sense to me. Stimuli
only included sets of materials for which four experts in Language
and Literature agreed on which option represented the most
appropriate interpretation of the metaphorical expression.
Procedure
The computer-based procedure was programmed on DMDX
software (Forster and Forster, 2003). The administration was self-
paced, and involved groups of three or less participants working
individually. During a brief instructional phase, participants
of both groups were told that they would receive several
metaphors—each one followed by four answer options—, and
that they would have to choose the option that best conveyed the
meaning of each metaphor. They were told that they could listen
to the metaphors and either option as many times as they needed
and that they could advance (return) to a subsequent (previous)
sentence by using the right (left) arrow keys, or replay the last
heard sentence using the downward key. They should select one
option by pressing the upward key immediately after such option
was played. Once an answer for a set was provided, they heard
“Now you can begin with the following metaphor.” Participants
could navigate back and forth between a current metaphor
and its options, but the system did not allow them to revisit
a previous set after its corresponding answer was confirmed.
While target sentences were preceded by the words “metaphor,”
answer options “a” to “d” were preceded, respectively, by the
words “option A,” “option B,” “option C” and “option D.”
After four practice trials, participants received the metaphorical
expressions in counterbalanced order. The presentation of the
answer options was also counterbalanced, except for the option
“The expression doesn’t make sense to me,” which was always
presented last. Participants took an average of 45 min to complete
the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 displays themean proportion of correct answers provided
by blind and sighted participants for each group of metaphorical
expressions. A 2 ⇥ 3 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with visual condition (blind vs. sighted) as between-subjects
factor and type of metaphorical expression (visual, grasping,
and other) as within-subjects factor was carried out to reveal
the e ects of these variables on participants’ comprehension
of metaphorical expressions (Greenhouse–Geisser correction
was applied do to a lack of sphericity in the data). Main
e ects were neither found for type of metaphorical expression,
F(1.65,62.80) = 0.292, MSE = 0.018, p = 0.706, !2p = 0.008, nor
for visual condition, F(1,38) = 0.093, MSE = 0.014, p = 0.762,
!2p = 0.002. The interaction between these factors was not
significant, F(1.65,62.80) = 0.360, MSE = 0.014, p = 0.659,
TABLE 1 | Mean proportions of correct answers for the comprehension of metaphorical expressions by blind and sighted participants, Experiment 1.
Blind participants Sighted participants
M SD M SD
Seeing metaphorical expressions 0.84 0.08 0.86 0.14
Grasping metaphorical expressions 0.85 0.08 0.83 0.14
Other metaphorical expressions 0.84 0.14 0.82 0.13
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!2p = 0.009. These data seems to indicate that congenitally
blind participants are comparable to their sighted peers both at
comprehending metaphorical language in general and in making
sense of other non-visual metaphorical expressions referred to
the target concept of understanding (derived from an alternative
primary conceptual metaphor). More strikingly, they equaled
their sighted peers at making sense of metaphorical expressions
derived from the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING conceptual
metaphor.
It should be noted, however, that most of the metaphorical
expressions used as critical stimuli were rather conventional, with
frequencies of occurrence in the “Google” corpus higher than 500
hits. Given the average conventionality of visual expressions (e.g.,
“obscure” means “di cult to understand”), blind participants
might have based their interpretation on a second sense of such
metaphorical concepts, a meaning which was already available in
their mental lexicon and which may have already lost its link with
its corresponding literal visual sense (Glucksberg, 2001; Bowdle
and Gentner, 2005). It could be the case that, as opposed to
understanding conventional expressions, making sense of novel
metaphorical expressions makes it unavoidable to access the
literal meaning of base concepts and, according to an embodied
version of the career of metaphor thesis, even to recruit the
sensory-motor experiences that characterize the base domain (the
neural career of metaphor, Desai et al., 2011). Experiment 2 was
carried out to assess whether congenitally blind participants are
on par with their sighted peers in their comprehension of novel
metaphorical expressions derived from the UNDERSTANDING
IS SEEING conceptual metaphor, or whether they show a more
limited understanding of this type of expressions.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
Twenty congenitally blind (10 female, mean age = 27.2 years,
SD = 3.88) and 20 sighted participants (12 female, mean
age = 18.85 years, SD = 0.67) took part in the experiment for
a stipend. All of them were native speakers of Spanish, and
were first and second year undergraduates at major Argentine
universities. The causes of blindness included retinopathy of
prematurity (9), congenital glaucoma (6), and optic nerve
abnormalities (5). All subjects signed an informed consent for
participation in the study in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki. No participants of Experiment 2 had previously
participated in Experiment 1.
Materials and Procedure
As in Experiment 1, participants listened to a set of 30 short (<5
words) sentences comprising 10 visual metaphorical expressions,
10 grasping metaphorical expressions, and 10 other metaphorical
expressions not derived from conceptual metaphors.Appendix B
lists the original visual expressions in Spanish, together with
their English translation. All metaphorical expressions as well
as their slight modifications showed no or extremely low (<5
hits) occurrence in the “Google” corpus. As in Experiment 1,
each metaphorical expression was followed by a multiple choice
question including four options: its most appropriate meaning,
two defensible but less precise expressions of its meaning,
and a “the expression doesn’t make sense to me” option. As
in Experiment 1, stimuli only included sets of materials for
which four experts in Language and Literature agreed on which
option represented the most appropriate interpretation of the
metaphorical expression. The procedure followed with blind and
sighted participants was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 displays themean proportion of correct answers provided
by blind and sighted participants for each group of novel
metaphorical expressions. A 2 ⇥ 3 mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with visual condition (blind vs. sighted) as between-
subjects factor and type of metaphorical expression (visual,
grasping, and other) as within-subjects factor was carried out to
reveal the e ects of these variables on the comprehension of novel
metaphorical expressions. Main e ects were neither found for
type of metaphorical expression, F(2,76) = 1.845, MSE = 0.004,
p = 0.165, !2p = 0.046, nor for visual condition, F(1,38) = 0.002,
MSE = 0.052, p = 0.968, !2p = 0.000. The interaction between
these variables was not significant, F(2,76) = 0.475,MSE = 0.052,
p = 0.623, !2p = 0.012.
These data reveal that congenitally blind participants are
comparable to their sighted peers both at comprehending novel
metaphorical expressions in general and in making sense of non-
visual metaphorical expressions referred to the target concept
of understanding. Despite a lack of experience with the visual
domain, blind participants also equaled their sighted peers at
making sense of metaphorical expressions derived from the
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
From the embodied perspective of conceptual metaphor theory,
it follows that congenitally blind participants might face serious
TABLE 2 | Mean proportions of correct answers for the comprehension of metaphorical expressions by blind and sighted participants, Experiment 2.
Blind participants Sighted participants
M SD M SD
Seeing metaphorical expressions 0.72 0.16 0.71 0.12
Grasping metaphorical expressions 0.74 0.13 0.73 0.14
Other metaphorical expressions 0.70 0.16 0.71 0.13
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di culties for making sense of visual metaphors, on the grounds
that their comprehension requires real-time simulations of the
sensory-motor experiences on which they are grounded. In
contrast to an embodied account, dominant theories of analogical
thinking have conceived of metaphorical processing as involving
propositional structures that combine amodal representations of
concepts, a position that is also compatible with recent hybrid
models of concept representation. From this perspective, blind
participants could conceivably make sense of visual metaphors
to the extent that their (amodal) literal representations of visual
concepts include the essential information that is required to
support their metaphorical application.
Experiment 1 failed to detect group di erences in
understanding this particular kind of expressions. Given
the rather conventional nature of the metaphors employed
in Experiment 1, it could be argued that blind participants
could have interpreted these utterances by way of accessing a
second meaning of the metaphorical terms employed in such
expressions, one that may have lost its connection with the literal
sense from which they were derived (see, e.g., Glucksberg, 2001;
Bowdle and Gentner, 2005). With this possibility in mind, in
Experiment 2 we presented blind and sighted participants with
novel visual metaphors that had either low or no occurrences in
the “Google” corpus. Despite the novelty of these metaphorical
expressions, blind participants showed a comprehension that
was not only accurate in absolute terms, but also similar to
that of their sighted peers. One possible way to make sense of
this finding would consist in positing that despite the minimal
frequency of novel metaphorical expressions, their interpretation
rests on well-rehearsed mechanisms for extending visual
concepts to the domain of comprehension. Given that there
are numerous high-frequency visual metaphors for the target
domain of understanding, it is conceivable that both blind and
sighted populations are familiar with those aspects of the base
domain that are recurrently selected to be projected onto the
domain of understanding. Hence, interpreting metaphorical
expressions with low or no frequency could conceivably be
easy even for blind participants, as long as those metaphors
appeal to aspects of the base domain that are recurrently
projected onto the target. To exemplify, when interpreting a
rather conventional expression like A maquillaged version of
reality we can either access a second meaning of maquillage
or a pre-stored representation of this particular metaphorical
expression. But if someone now utters a completely novel
expression such as A photoshopped version of reality, making
sense of such sentence as implying a biased rendition of reality
might not be significantly more demanding than in the former
case, since the relevant meaning of photoshopped in this context
can easily be derived. To a great extent, conceptual metaphors
are universal knowledge structures that are associated to the
structure of our body and of our exchanges with the world. As
such, they impose strong constraints on the space of possible
innovations in metaphoric production. These considerations can
shed new light to intuitions like those of Jorge Luis Borges, who
asserted that: “though there are hundreds and indeed thousands
of metaphors to be found, they may all be traced back to a
few simple patterns” (Borges, 1967/2000, p. 40). Future studies
should assess whether comprehending metaphors that exploit
rare or infrequent aspects of the base domain might require the
availability of modal representations.
Even though the ideas that led to the hypothesis that blind
participants could conceivably understand visual metaphors
stem from with an amodal account of how literal concepts
and conceptual metaphors are represented (e.g., with the
propositional model of Bowdle and Gentner, 2005), the
comprehension capabilities exhibited by blind participants
cannot be conclusively taken to confirm an amodal account
of how these conceptual structures are encoded and processed.
From an embodied perspective, it could be argued that blind
participants make sense of visual metaphorical expressions via
non-visual sensory-motor simulations. In support of this idea, a
long tradition exploring the imagery capabilities of congenitally
blind individual (e.g., Kerr, 1983; Zimler and Keenan, 1983; see
Kaski, 2002, for a review) had suggested that they can handle
mental representations that preserve spatial aspects of reality
such as distance and occlusion. Hence, blind participants could
make sense of an utterance like A dense cloud obscured his
ideas by activating a spatial version of the COMPREHENDING
IS SEEING conceptual metaphor, in terms of which a tangible
entity (e.g., a piece of cloth) is interposed between the observer
and an object that would otherwise be reachable. Similarly, it
is possible that for metaphorical expressions such as A closer
look at the idea will reveal its imperfections, blind participants
may have learned (see, e.g., Landau and Gleitman, 1985) how
to perform experiential “translations” of metaphorically visual
concepts in terms of concepts related to touching or grasping,
and thus, to simulate visual metaphors in these terms (e.g.,
they could simulate the referred expression as an act of slowly
probing a surface so as to reveal its subtle rugosities). Despite
the plausibility of this account for rather conventional visual
metaphors as those exemplified above, it is not easy to foresee
how it could be extended to explain the interpretation of some
of the novel expressions included in Experiment 2, whose visual
terms resist an easy translation into purely spatial or haptic
experiences. Further studies are required to determine which of
these two approaches best accounts of how blind populations
cope with making sense of visual metaphors. In turn, this line
of inquiry will benefit from achieving a deeper understanding
of how the blind acquire and represent the literal meaning of
visual concepts. One promising avenue for research could consist
in employing brain imaging techniques to assess whether the
literal vs. metaphoric use of visual concepts by congenitally blind
participants can be accommodated by the hybrid models recently
proposed, as well as whether the patterns of brain activation
elicited by these expressions di er between blind and sighted
participants. Even though the present results indicate that these
populations are equally able to comprehend conventional as
well as novel visual metaphors, we see no reasons to assume
that both populations will base their comprehension of these
expressions on an amodal substrate: whereas blind participants
would necessarily employ amodal symbols, sighted participants
could conceivably recruit both kinds of representations.
The present investigation represents an extreme exemplar
of a broader tradition of studies finding that blind individuals
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manage to match their sighted peers on tasks and activities
for which intuitive considerations might lead to anticipate a
relative disadvantage. Advancing our understanding of how blind
individuals make sense of visual metaphors will contribute to
a broader understanding of how the blind as well as other
sensorily deprived populations overcome significant limitations
for acquiring knowledge about their environment.
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APPENDIX A
Visual metaphorical expressions used in Experiment 1, along with their English translations.
Original Spanish expression English translation
1. Libro claro Clear book
2. Teoría oscura Obscure theory
3. Distinción borrosa Blurry distinction
4. Cambiar de punto de vista Change of point of view
5. Interpretación brillante Brilliant interpretation
6. Entrever una dificultad Glimpse a di culty
7. Explicación transparente Transparent explanation
8. Idea maquillada Maquillaged idea
9. Descripción panorámica Panoramic description
10. Análisis miope Myopic analysis
APPENDIX B
Visual metaphorical expressions used in Experiment 2, along with their English translations.
Original Spanish expression English translation
1. Ecografía de sus pensamientos Echography of her thoughts
2. Comprensión en 3D del fenómeno 3D comprehension of the phenomenon
3. Foto movida de la realidad Moved photograph of reality
4. Comentario laser Laser comment
5. Hechos fotoshopeados Photoshopped facts
6. Conclusión fluorescente Fluorescent conclusion
7. Ideas desteñidas O -colored ideas
8. Mente titilante Titling mind
9. Teoría translúcida Translucent theory
10. Entendimiento con luces de posición Understanding with parking lights
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